First: energy and security, a continual history
The term "energy security" involves a large number of issues, many of which are related to the various energy sources. Securing petroleum products for transportation and energy remain, for the majority of industrialized countries, synonymous with securing access to foreign oil supplies at reasonable prices. For most industrial countries, "safety power" continues to be a synonym for controlling prices for petroleum supplies.
The security of oil supplies has become a key element in strategic planning since the First World War. The United Kingdom was among the first major powers that have suffered from sensitive access to oil in times of war. This was especially the case when Lord Winston Churchill-before the First World War- made the transition from coal to oil to supply the Royal British warships. The United Kingdom did not possess domestic sources of oil, unlike the United States. With the outbreak of the war, Britain tried to control new sources of oil. The failure did not affect the British access to the local needs of oil, and continued military operations until February 1917, when Germany resumed its campaign in the war using submarines, which led to the paralysis of the Royal Navy shortage of oil. This had a profound impact on military planners, and had them focus on how to avoid it in the future.
We have access to an important part of the oil strategy of the Axis and the Allies during the Second World War. The Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) suffered shortage of fuel supplies. The Soviet Union was promised to be left free in the Persian Gulf if the Allies defeated Germany. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 was in part o reach Ukraine’s rich sources, and in part to protect the vital supplies from Romania. The German strategy in 1941 – 1942 was based on access to Stalingrad, and moving to control oil the Caucasus. One of the motives behind the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack in December 17, 1941 attack was the United States effective oil ban, and the need for Japan to secure the oil resources of Indonesia.
The United States was able to supply the Allies with huge operations in the Second World War. The burden of the American military professionals made them pessimistic about the ability of America to make any other long-term, with the assumption that a war with the Soviet Union could last three or four years (settled by few nuclear weapons) due to shortage of oil. Thus, a strong emphasis in Western military plans was to secure oil fields in the Middle East before any future conflict.
In contrast to the United States, Europe cannot rely on domestic supply to meet the growing demand in time of peace. The energy crisis after World War II increased the European dependence on Middle Eastern oil. To a remarkable degree, the cold winters and energy crisis led the US to reassess its role in leading the world in the wake of victory and the end of hostilities in February 1947. This role has emerged in the United States’ decision to replace the United Kingdom as protector of Greece and Turkey, and in the rebuilding of Europe (Marshall project, which was announced in June 1947). One of the implications of the draft Marshall is the further transmission of Europe from coal to oil as fuel for industry and power generation. This meant greater reliance on Gulf oil, especially after the emergence of abundant supplies there. Then, the current boom began in the Middle East oil, after the region has seen a rapid expansion in the fields and distribution systems, including the new pipelines to the Mediterranean.
During the 1950s, the attempts to control the oil and distribute it hurried the occurrence of two crises in the Middle East. The first crisis was in 1951 when the Iranian government nationalized the its oil. While the second occurred in 1956 when Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in reaction to the decision taken by the United States and Britain to cancel World Bank loan to help Egypt in the construction of the High Dam in Aswan. The United Kingdom and France launched a war against Egypt, in-part, to secure control of the supply of oil from the Gulf to Europe via the Suez Canal.
The issue of energy security strategy changed after the Arab oil embargo in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, for several reasons:
First, the appearance of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a strong balance in the face of industrialized countries.
Second, the growing military capabilities of the Soviet Union that has the power to cut the supply of vital raw materials from the Middle East and Africa. This has led to the development of western military strategies budget to protect oil supplies, especially from the Persian Gulf, and to defend the sea-lanes.
Third, the emergence of the environmental movement and influential figures that advocate the prevention of economic expansion.
However, the pessimistic scenarios that prevailed in the 1970s did not materialize.
In the mid-1990s, some forecasted an energy crisis due to a growth of Asian economies, and the growing needs for energy, particularly in China and India.
Second: the dilemmas of contemporary security
Fears focus more on the stability of oil prices, and less on the possibility of global confrontation between the major powers. If supplies fell from a particular region, such as the Gulf, prices will increase in the short term until the market balanced. From the economic standpoint, it does not matter that North America and Western Europe imported 20% and 29%, respectively, of oil from the Gulf, while Asia imports 74%, since the three regions will be affected equally if dropped supplies from the Gulf or anywhere else.
A sudden rise in oil prices has serious consequences for consumers or producers. Oil price raises has important political repercussions. Electorates in the United States are very sensitive to the issue of oil prices. During the presidential campaign in the United States in 1996, a modest increase in the price of gasoline caused American Republican candidate Bob Dole to say that the energy crisis is serious. Despite the obvious exaggeration, Americans still remember the effects of high oil prices in the 1970s.
In the long range, it is expected that the rise in oil prices lead to a reduction in demand, and thus the price collapse, which gives industrial powers effective mechanisms of adaptation. In addition, it could help the petroleum partnership agreements made by the International Energy Agency IEA in 1974, and the United States to maintain a strategic reserve of oil. However, it should be noted that many of those that did not participate in the agreements and the International Energy Agency, or did not follow the plan, may be exposed to devastating effects in the case of the rapid rise in oil prices. The rise of oil prices in 1990-1991 took India to the brink of bankruptcy and forced it to make radical reforms. Many emerging economies today are facing a similar position. The impact of good exporters from the low price is that it encourages consumption and therefore greater reliance on the security cheap Gulf oil. In the long run, low prices might lead to a retreat from efforts to maintain strong oil industry, and develop alternatives to petroleum economy. The negative effects, is that low prices directly affect the returns, and therefore the budgets of the oil producing Gulf States will cause serious political problems
Low returns also limit the size of domestic capital that could be invested in major oil producers' infrastructure of new oil. As a result, the growing pressure on the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council GCC, and Iran, to amend their national policies does not encourage foreign investment in the oil sector.
This was evident when the then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in September 1998 called on the West to invest in the infrastructure of oil in Saudi Arabia.
Third: the growing demand for Gulf oil
The demand on energy will increase, by 2020, three times more than it was in the 1970s, and this growing demand will be saturated by oil, natural gas, and coal. The energy needs of the newly industrialized nations will increase to double by 2010. It is expected that the global demand for oil will increase from 71.6 million barrels a day in 1997 to more than 115 million barrels a day by 2020. In 1995, the States of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD consumed about two thirds of world oil supplies. In the next two decades, it is expected to consume about one third of these countries the increase in demand only.
That could change several unforeseen developments from the projections of energy demand, most notably: global economic recession, changing tax and subsidy policies in the major energy-consuming result of environmental concerns and other radical development in energy technologies to make them more efficient and less costly. With these developments in mind can be expected tracks in fifteen or twenty years ahead.
On one hand, there is enough oil in the world to meet global demand in the distant future. The problem lies in extracting oil from the ground, and ensuring distribution in the market at an acceptable price. In the face of access to oil, there are political, economic and regulatory obstacles - not geological. In addition, it should be noted that at a time of increasing reserves of oil and natural gas and coal in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin, these regions are preparing one of the most volatile regions in the world. Since the Gulf alone contains more than 64% of the worlds confirmed oil reserves, and is seen as able to meet the escalating demand for energy by the industrial countries. Therefore, the Gulf will remain a vital source of oil, and could become the Caspian basin another important source of oil and gas.
Fourth: the association Persian Gulf
The Persian Gulf region will be of essential interest of the foreign policy of the United States. "Bb Amoco" says, the major producers in the Gulf have about 675 billion barrels of oil, or nearly two thirds of known global reserves. The Gulf is the first in the world production level has secured combined daily approximately 21 million barrels per day in 1999, a rate of about 30% of world production. Because the Gulf believes such a large share of production, the state decides the price usually sold.
Although the United States received only 18% of its oil import from the Persian Gulf, it has great strategic interest in the stability of energy production Gulf because major allies - especially Japan and West African States-depend on the region's imports. The large size of Gulf oil exports will contribute to the maintenance of world oil prices relatively low, and this is reflected on the benefits of the American economy based on oil. Then, because domestic production to decline, the United States will become more dependent on exports of the Gulf. As a result, the energy plan declares, "this region will be vital to the interests of the United States."
There is no doubt that the United States played a prominent role in the affairs of the Persian Gulf since the Second World War. With the end of that war, a President Franklin Roosevelt signed an agreement with the King of Saudi Arabia, King Abdul Aziz bin Saudi in which the United States agreed to protect the royal family from internal and external enemies in return for access to the privileges of access to Saudi oil. Later, the United States agreed to provide security assistance to the Shah of Iran and the leaders of Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. These agreements lead to transfer huge amounts of weapons and ammunition to the American Gulf states, and sometimes to the deployment of American forces there.
The American policy to protect the energy production from the Gulf were unambiguous: when there is a threat the United States is using all necessary means, including military forces to ensure the continued flow of oil. The President Jimmy Carter was the first who explained this principle in January 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the shah. The policy of the United States continues to use force in many events consistent with the "principle Carter": First in 1987-88 to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from rocket attacks and boats Iranian during the Iran-Iraq war. Then in 1990-1991 to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
Today the "principle of Carter" is still vital as in the past. Between 1991 and 2001,the Ministry of Defense expand its capabilities essential for the American military in the Gulf, including published air and naval forces in the region and additional re storage of weapons and ammunition to ground troops are enormous. All these capabilities established in the autumn of 2001 through the work the American attack on "Al Qaeda" fighters and the Taliban in Afghanistan and processes relevant to the Gulf Region (with the fact that Saudi Arabia imposed some restrictions on the use of American air bases on their territory). The United States continued to sell sophisticated weapons worth billions of dollars from friendly regimes in the region, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates. To ensure greater protection of the flow of oil from the risk of any disruption, the United States of America occupy Iraq.
American policy makers are facing two serious challenges in the future: to ensure greater Saudi Arabian and Gulf oil production to the extent consistent with the growing demand, and protect Saudi Arabia itself from internal disturbance.
There is an urgent need to increase production, especially in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia possesses a quarter of known oil reserve in the world (and appreciation 265 billion barrels) and it is the only state who is able to meet American and global demand. The Ministry of American energy production says that Saudi oil must double, in the next twenty years, from 11.4 million to 23.1 million barrels a day, to meet the expected global needs. However, the increased production of 11.7 million barrels per day - the equivalent of the current total production to the United States and Canada - would cost hundreds of billions of dollars, there will be immense technical and logistical challenges. Analysts believe that the best way to achieve the necessary increase is to persuade Saudi Arabia to open its oil sector to the huge investments of the American oil companies. Under the energy plan by the American administration, this is what entirely by the President. Nevertheless, any American effort to exert pressure on Riyadh to allow the largest American oil investments in the Kingdom is expected to get a great deal of resistance from the royal family, which nationalized American oil companies in the 1970s.
The administration faced another problem in Saudi Arabia; the American security relationship with Israel has become a major source of tension with the Saudi population in the kingdom. It is this hostile atmosphere to the United States that made it easy for Osama bin Laden's organization to attract followers. After September 11, the Saudi government has taken stringent measures against some of these forces, but popular opposition to the military cooperation with Washington remains strong. Therefore, one of the most difficult challenges facing policy Americans makers in the coming years is to find a way to dispel the opposition with persuade Riyadh to increase its oil shipments to the United States.
Fifth: Conclusions
The Security of Persian Gulf will remain a strategic challenge of the global economy. The reliance on the oil will increase in the coming decades. The growing needs of the Asian Petroleum Gulf coincide with the retreat of international support for American policy in the region. Any major military confrontation in the Gulf could affect oil supply, where the decline in oil prices is one of the most dangerous sources of instability in the world today.
Based on these data, the continuation of the Iraqi crisis and the American stance towards Iran increases the instability in the region. In addition, the US military occupation will cause political chaos in the Islamic world. Over time, the emergence of Asian countries as key consumers of Gulf oil will reduce the scope of the unilateral American action.
There is a clear link between security in the Persian Gulf and the oil and oil exportation; therefore, the interest of all countries in the region should be to look for realistic solutions. This is the realistic policy of Iran that speaks of creating good relations in the Gulf by extending political and economic bridges. Practically this is done through the evident openness during the visit of President Ahmadinejad to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in an attempt to search for common frameworks to avoid the American schemes targeting all countries of the region and its bounty without exception.
In fact, oil security in the region requires subjective conditions of the Gulf States, first and foremost. These subjective conditions stem from the need for awareness of Arab States to the American occupation of Iraq and its presence in some countries in the region, and the removal of these issues, which portends very significant negative repercussions not only on oil but on the whole, economy, peace and security, on both regional and international levels.
Dr. Khalil Husseinis a professor of international public law at the Lebanese university and the director of legal studies at Lebanese Parliament.
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