Syria took a much anticipated yet overdue step last week, appealing directly to the United Nations to bring UN persecutor Detlev Mehlis, to justice. The German attorney’s name had graced an ill-fated and dramatic report, issued by the UN in October 2005, accusing Syria of assassinating Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik al-Harriri.
Back then, Mehlis had authored a 53-page report that ripped through Syria and Lebanon like a thunderstorm, reading like an Agatha Christie murder novel, rather than a professional legal document. The report read, "There is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former Prime Minister Rafik al-Harriri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officials and could not have been further organized without the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security services."
Syria’s appeal, four years down the road, was presented to the UN by Foreign Minister Walid al-Mouallem, who said that Mehlis and his assistant Gerhard Lehmann had tried “to implicate the Syrian Arab Republic at any cost” in the February 14, 2005 explosions in Beirut that killed Harriri, ex-Economy Minister Basil Fleiham, and 22 others.
Syria has plenty of reason to believe that Mehlis is guilty of fraud, especially that none of his findings were authenticated by any of the persecutors who succeeded him, including the most recent Canadian one, Daniel Bellemare. Additionally, based on Mehlis’ findings, four senior Lebanese officers were arrested back in 2005, on the charges of involvement in the Harriri Case.
Last April, however, all of them were released by an international court, due to lack of any evidence, shedding serious doubt on Mehlis’ professionalism. One of the officers, Jamil Sayyed, gave several press interviews after his release, saying that Mehlis had tried talking him into naming any Syrian official in the crime—in exchange for his release from jail—regardless if this official were guilty.
The Syrian letter, addressed to the US presidency of the Security Council, read: “They (Mehlis and his deputy) attempted to induce Sayyed to persuade Syria to identify an official victim who would admit to the crime and subsequently be discovered to have committed suicide or killed in a road accident, whereupon a settlement would be reached with Syria." Mouallem added that Syria "greatly regrets that misuse of power" by Mehlis and believes that "the secretary general should investigate the matter and the above-mentioned serious events whereby Syria was targeted through a United Nations body."
Mouallem wrapped up that Syria has the right to take legal action against the German persecutor, “with regard to the injury they did to Syria by using perjured evidence and departing from the rules and principles of the investigation." Although the International Tribunal, which has been operational since March 1, has effectively backed out on all of Mehlis’ claims, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon came out this week, saying that Detlev Mehlis will not be brought to court, based on Syria’s request.
Back in 2005, Syria had worked hard at drowning the Mehlis Report, which drew widespread anger on the Syrian street, which believed that it had been authored under influence of the Bush White House. Riad Daoudi, legal advisor to the Syrian Foreign Minister, said it had relied on, "pre-set ideas to reach conclusions that are of a political nature and that point to Syria as a suspect with no evidence". He expressed deep regret that Mehlis had relied on the witness of people who were known for their anti-Syrian stance and "ignores" the witness of Syrian officials.
From Washington, Syrian ambassador Imad Mustapha added, "The report is full of political rumors, gossip and hearsay, and it has not a single shred of evidence that will be accepted by any court of law. We are so disappointed with it." He, too, added that the report was political rather than professional. Bolton added that the report "speaks for itself" and is backed by "substantial evidence." Going back to the controversial Melhis Report, we can understand why the Syrians are so keen at bringing him to justice.
Reason 1
When investigating the murder, Mehlis had interviewed eight officials regarding a meeting between President Bashar al-Assad and Rafiq al-Harriri, dated August 26, 2004. These eight officials, all members of the anti-Syrian camp, were not present at the meeting, yet they confirmed, in section 27 of the Mehlis Report, without the shadow of a doubt, that Assad had threatened to bring down Lebanon on the Prime Minister’s head, if he did not renew the mandate of then-President Emille Lahhoud.
Mehlis gave a lot of weight to these accusations, without noting that all of them were made with a political purpose by men whose argument could be bias, since they were likely searching for an opportunity to incriminate Syria.
Reason 2
Among other things, Mehlis said that the decision to kill Harriri was made in July-December 2004 at the Meridian Hotel and then at the Presidential Palace in Damascus (section 96). This information is gathered from a Syrian witness, who was not identified, who used to work with Syrian intelligence in Lebanon. Again, had this information been backed with evidence, such as recorded talks, pictures, more than one witness, then it would have elicited some respect.
The only basis for such an accusation, however, was the testimony of the unnamed Syrian witness. This raised several questions: How would an average agent in the Syrian intelligence service know of such a supposedly high-level meeting? And in planning such a crime, couldn't these Syrian officials have chosen a more concealed and less public place than the Meridian?
Finally, how would the Syrian witness know so much about these meetings if he were not a member of the very closed crime circle (which Mehlis claims he is not). Surely, such a delicate crime was not public knowledge that an officer in the Syrian intelligence in Lebanon "stumbled" across. This unnamed Syrian witness said that a senior Syrian officer told him in January 2005 that Hariri was a problem for Syria.
Reason 3
One month later, this same officer said that there would be "an earthquake" in Lebanon that would re-write Lebanese history (section 97).This statement, from a legal point of view, is ridiculous. Two unknown people are talking in ambiguities. How can Syria respond to such an accusation if it does not know the name of the witness or of the officer? Had the report said: Syrian officer X told witness Y said that an "earthquake" would happen in Lebanon, then Syria would have no choice but to question and arrest Mr Y. This same witness says that he had visited several military bases in Lebanon and at one base he had seen "a Mitsubishi van" and not "the Mitsubishi van" that was used to carry the explosives to kill Hariri on February 14 (section 98).
The reasons mentioned above, the testimony of Jamil al-Sayyed, the innocence of the four officers, and the fact that nothing has been found to incriminate any Syrian in the Harriri Case all make Syria’s case all the more legitimate, before the United Nations.
Ban Ki Moon, however, said that bringing investigating Mehlis’ findings were “not in my domain.” If that is not in his domain, one wonders, what is the Secretary-General expected to do when someone carrying the UN name releases a report that is contested by parties involved, and which jeopardizes credibility of the United Nations?
On the UN website, Ban writes: “As Secretary-General, I resolve to: “Lead by example; Seek excellence with humility; Set the highest ethical standard; Pursue dialogue and engagement; Play the role of harmonizer and bridge-builder; Make transparency and accountability the cornerstone of my tenure; Be animated by both passion and compassion in achieving our goals; Be sensitive to the concerns of all Member States, big and small.”
From where Syria sees things, Ban Ki Moon fails in all eight objectives, if Detlev Mehlis is not questioned for what he said about Syria, in 2005.
Sami Moubayed is editor-in-chief of Forward Magazine in Syria.