Syria has suffered too long from solitude. The regional strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia and Egypt during much of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century was always fragile and recently impossible. Even the Iranian ally is kept away by a hostile Iraq before and after the American invasion. Their political alliance never succeeded in establishing a total trust due to the occasional Syrian-Israeli negotiations and more importantly their ideological differences; though largely silenced such differences still looming in the background.
Yet the regional cold and open wars with mostly adversary neighbors are not exactly a novelty for the Syrians. The absence of an international ally, however, with the collapse of the Soviet Union would have been a huge blow to the strategic approach of the Syrian regime. The quiet transition from the days of the Soviet strategic ally to the Syrian involvement in the reorganization of the regional security under the patronage of the United States may have softened the Syrian public reception of the new order. Still there was too much at stake especially with the Syrian insistence on the concept of the “strategic balance” to counter the Israeli stand even during times of extensive negotiations in the mid 1990s.
Any Syrian hope for a Soviet resuscitation should never come as a surprise notably in the circumstances of the recent years when the American invasion in Iraq and the Lebanese “spring” seemed to suggest a concerted effort not only to contain the Syrians but more gravely towards a policy of regime change involving even the French. Even though it has failed to bring any effective results such a policy must have reminded the Syrians of a former immunity provided by a world order partly led by the Soviet Union.
The current neo-Soviet Russian ambitions feed and get fed by various regional expectations throughout the world such as those from the Syrians—and by the way by the Venezuelans. It is only from the perspective of this context that we can approach the swift Syrian endorsement of the Russian invasion in Georgia. By denouncing the western “double standard” position on the Caucasian conflict they tend to borrow the same terminology from their discourse with regard the Syrian-Israeli conflict suggesting the patterns of a worldwide conflict in which Syria and Russia standing in the same line. Certainly the news of the Israeli intensive military cooperation with the Georgians had an effect on the Syrian quick response.
Still the Syrian bid on a neo-Soviet Russia should not be overestimated. The circumstances of the Syrian presidential visit to Russia are more than suggestive of the Syrians’ hesitance to put all their cards on a Russian roulette. It was preceded by official statements to the Russian media by President Assad invoking openly “the priority of the military cooperation” between the two parts and more precisely the suggestion, as reported in an interview to Russian newspapers, of the installation of the Russian ballistic “Alexander” missiles in Syrian territories. Yet the headlines the Syrian media of August 22 not only they overshadowed such reports but they reported, as did the pro-government news website “Syria News”, official denials that the Syrian-Russian presidential talks “ever touched on the issue of the installation of Russian missiles on the Syrian territories” let alone the Syrian demand for such an installation.
Syria’s Assads has always proven a high degree of alertness in order not to upset too much the United States. Even during the Cold War President Hafez Assad was known to be very cautious in his reliance on the Soviet ally so that it would not put him too far from any American strategy. His Lebanese policy was the perfect example of such caution. This approach towards the two major powers was one of the reasons of the inner conflicts in the Baath Party with Saleh Jadid that led to his accession to power in 1970. President Bashshar Assad seems, in fact, to follow his father’s instincts. But this caution seems to originate also from the Russian public statements, as those by the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, which emphasized the Russian intentions that any missiles deal would not “interfere with the balance of power in the region”.
As much as the Russian ambitions are playing with the Syrian ambitions, the Russian cautiousness seems also to fuel a Syrian cautiousness. The Syrians probably think that any bid on the Russians should never be by any means greater than the Russians’ bid on the Syrians.
Tarek Kahlaoui is an Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern Art History and History at Rutgers University. He comments regularly on Middle Eastern politics in Arabic in “Aljazeera.net” and the Qatari newspaper “al-Arab”. His articles and comments are found in his blog.
Operation Breakfast Redux