When, by the end of the 1990s, the Egyptian government successfully discredited the Islamist armed movements, notably the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), a new political phase began defined by the consolidation of President Hosni Mubarek’s regime. Last week during the festivities of the Eid el-Fitr, the Islamic holyday marking the end of the month of Ramadan, leaders from both movements expressed in the most public manner their support of the regime demanding all Islamists to withdraw from political activism and focus on religious preaching. Yet a decade after that historic defeat nothing seems to be in order even with the pacified Jihadist movements.
Ironically it was due to the actions of the same Islamist groups that Mubarek came to power. The emergence of a Jihadist trend within the Egyptian Islamist movement was one of the manifestations of the turmoil of the end of the 1970s, which reached its climax with the EIJ’s assassination of President Anwar Sadat leaving the presidency to the hands of his deputy Hosni Mubarek. The effective momentary truce achieved by the new regime with EIG and EIJ in the beginning of the 1980s through mild verdicts was only the prelude to a long intense and then armed conflict with the two groups.
The Egyptian regime defeated EIG and EIJ by using a varied package of incentives and violence. The continuous political and more importantly ideological dialogues conducted by the ministry of interior with the imprisoned leaders paid off when a majority of them announced in 1998 the end of violence on religious and political basis. More recently an even larger group of political leaders and major ideologues of the Egyptian Jihadist movement theorized their defeat and their “wrong doings” on religious terms. They did not simply announce defeat but they justified it on the same religious grounds used when they began their conflict with the regime.
With such an overwhelming victory Mubarek’s regime ended a long history of political disorder and seemed in a position to overcome any internal threats. The international community helped consolidate the Egyptian government through large loans and financial aid. A concerted effort started by the end of the 1990s to promote Egypt’s touristic sector, one of its major financial resources, which succeeded in putting Egyptian destinations among the most visited worldwide.
Yet increasing indicators, including economy, are pointing to the erosion of the political power of the regime. A large economic crisis has been underlying the regime’s fragile political base. Following the current global financial crisis the Egyptian stock exchange’s main index hit this week one of its lowest points in its history, which highlighted an already ongoing crisis. By the beginning of this year prices jumped to high records. Even compared to the worldwide food crisis, partly complicated by countries like Egypt stopping their exports of rice, the average consumer’s purchasing power was severely reduced. The images this winter and spring of long and sometimes even deadly lines to buy bread were overshadowed by the violent street confrontations in April between textile workers and the security forces.
The regime’s nervous response was more clearly expressed with its increasing judicial crackdown on political activism. To be fair Egyptian judicial system is usually seen as one of the best in the region in terms of its neutrality and independence. Yet it is still within political influence, which can be best seen in politically driven persecutions. The most notable example is the long trial of many leaders of the peaceful Muslim Brotherhood targeting their financial resources following their rise in the 2005 legislative elections unprecdently giving them more than 80 seats in the Egyptian parliament. This is a reminder of a prior trial following the elections of 2005 that targeted liberal presidential candidate Aymen Nour.
The trial and the two years prison conviction last August of sociologist and human rights activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim for “defaming Egypt” marked another striking example of implementing the judicial system to persecute political adversaries. The more recent trial and jail conviction of Ibrahim Eissa, editor of the daily Al-Doustour, for reporting “false information” with regards to the health of President Mubarek is the last example of the ongoing political trials. Mubarek’s presidential amnesty few days later suggests the hesitance of the regime to combine persecutions of political adversaries with dealing with dissident journalists in a country that rightfully brags about its free press.
The continuous and growing crack down on street manifestations comes as another indicator of the regime’s nervousness. In addition to the occasional limited standing protests focusing on human rights issues there is an expanding movement possibly with more chances to energize mainstream Egyptians attempting to lift the embargo on Gaza strip. In October 6th some of the main train stations in Cairo were heavily surrounded by security forces to prevent political activists from leading an “anti embargo caravan”.
This comes during a difficult time for the inner circles of the regime especially the young businessmen-politicians surrounding Jamal Mubarek the hopeful successor of his father. A long public controversy emphasized the conflict of interests presented in the example of Ahmed Ezz the steel manufacturing tycoon who is also one of the rising leaders in the governing party and more importantly the chairman of the “planning and budget committee” in the Egyptian parliament. A month ago Hisham Moustafa Talaat, another businessman-politician who is a major real estate developer in Egypt and a rising figure in the high ranks of the governing party, was charged in a scandal involving the murder of a Lebanese singer in Dubai.
The succeeding misfortunes during the last weeks bring old memories of the kind of chaos that would precede political changes in Egyptian modern history. The cliff collapse in one of Cairo’s slums smashing 50 houses and the involvement of security forces in an attempt to shut down any protests brought paradoxally a wide media coverage. The series of fires starting from August including in two historical buildings in Cairo, the Egyptian Parliament and the National Theater, and more recently this week in major textile factories brings to memories the infamous “Cairo fires” that preceded the “23 of July Revolution” in 1952.
Egypt’s increasing worries are difficult to fully assess as yet. They seem, however, the right ingredients for a recipe of a structural political crisis involving more than a few Jihadist groups with an alienating agenda to mainstream Egyptians.
Tarek Kahlaoui is an Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern Art History and History at Rutgers University. He comments regularly on Middle Eastern politics in Arabic in “Aljazeera.net” and the Qatari newspaper “al-Arab”. His articles and comments are found in his blog.
Operation Breakfast Redux