A tale of two Spartas

The meeting between Tunisian President Kais Saied and the United Arab Emirates’ Envoy and Minister of State Sheikh Shakhbout bin Nahyan Al Nahyan carries many indications.

The meeting constituted a quick Emirati response, only days after Tunisian Foreign Minister Nabil Ammar visited Abu Dhabi where he was received by Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. These are more than just a few positive signals.

Sheikh Shakhbout has dealt with more than one sensitive regional file in the past. Before assuming the portfolio of the ministry of state, he was the UAE’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, at the height of regional tensions and the Gulf boycott of Qatar. He subsequently moved on from his ambassadorial post to the cabinet position. He was entrusted with broader issues, especially those with African and strategic dimensions. He was well-equipped to handle such files considering his technical, administrative and military academic training at Sandhurst.

The recent visit to Tunis constituted a special mission for a young diplomat in his prime. Veteran diplomat Nabil Ammar could make a lot of mileage for his country working with Sheikh Shakhbout.

The positive outlook which I foresee is quite justified. Tunisia is no longer what it used to be. Putting aside the difficult economic situation it faces, the country is on its way to closing the political gaps left by the democratic transition that ensued after 2011.

Today, Tunisia has a president who has plans in mind, intends to implement his vision and does not back down. Whether one agrees or not with Saied’s decisions is another matter altogether. What is certain, however, is that the Tunisian president is unlikely to come back to you after an agreement is reached or decision is made to tell you that internal or regional political flexibility requires a review of the matter.

The falling out between the UAE and Tunisia, following the 2014 elections was due to the late President Beji Caid Essebsi’s reversal of his positions after securing the parliamentary majority and winning the presidential election. This is something about which I personally queried Caid Essebsi on two occasions and in two formal interviews, which I conducted about two years apart. In the first instance, he defended his decision, and in the second one, he seemed to regret that decision accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of deceit.

Today’s Tunisia is a different country that deserves reconsideration. Economic pressures, as one can see, have affected everything, except the will of its political leadership. On all occasions, Saied reminds Tunisians that they are a free nation that is shielded by its sense of sovereignty, not by financial flows or by the acceptance of external conditions.

The Tunisian president wasted no time asking the question of where the tens of billions of dollars of financial support, whether in loans, grants and deposits, have gone. Tunisians know the scope of the failures produced by the co-habitation rule of Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes, which has brought the country to its current situation.

Tunisians are also hard-headed people. Oftentimes, their stubbornness can take one aback. But eventually one realises that this stubbornness is part of the Tunisian mindset. This is reflected in many forms of daily behaviour, whether in government work or on the street. For Tunisians, dignity comes first, well before any other consideration.

The time seems therefore appropriate to open a new chapter in the relationship between the UAE and Tunisia. From the composition of the visiting delegation to Tunisia or the statements that followed the meeting with the President, one can sense this is a different matter.

The UAE’s expression of readiness to help Tunisia deal with its difficult economic situation dispels the impression that the country is cut off from its Arab environment and that it has to reckon with being a hostage to the good will of Rome and Brussels.

There are some potentially helpful cues. Take, for instance, the fact that the delegation was political in nature. It was headed by a minister who talked about lending support to Tunisia.

Although the Tunisian president referred in his statement during the meeting to infrastructure, renewable energy, water desalination, health, digital transformation, education and tourism projects, and encouraged Emirati investments in Tunisia, Sheikh Shakhbout’s response indicated that the UAE was keen to continue helping Tunisia in several fields and providing it with needed support to overcome the challenges it faces.

The UAE’s envoy pointed out that the Emirati delegation accompanying him will coordinate with the concerned Tunisian authorities to identify joint projects in several fields and start implementing them as soon as possible. Referring to time is an important signal.

There was no direct talk about investments. It is clear that it is the Emirati state which has moved closer to Tunisia, not UAE investors, financiers or company owners.

These may seem like small details. But they are not so, for several reasons. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed is aware of the burden that Tunisia has borne and has been bearing for years. The second target of the Muslim Brotherhood project after Egypt was Tunisia. The Brotherhood project in Egypt fell by a knockout. Islamists’ project in Tunisia was destroyed by the country’s pervasive rationality that weakened the Muslim Brotherhood over the years before blowing the movement to smithereens.

The fall of Islamists was brought on by the country’s sense of social balance, the calm of its tolerant Islamists and the resilience of the deeply-rooted state which refused to disengage in all circumstances. This included the time of the Brotherhood’s empowerment pursuit in government through jobs, official positions, and use of money provided by donors as well as financial loans as recruitment budgets in order to expand its sphere of influence, appease others with wage increases and in the meanwhile shelve all development projects.

The squandering of resources exposed the Islamists’ ineptitude while heightening the budget deficit and pushing the country to the brink of an unprecedented financing and imports crisis.

Saied anticipated the political chaos two years ago as the state was unable to assume its responsibility in providing vital health services to the population while the parliament morphed into a boxing ring.

However, the political decision to dissolve the government, expand the president’s powers and freeze (then dissolve) the parliament, is different from dealing with a worsening economic crisis, which has dilapidated funds while failing to address the core of the crisis.

Economic reform is a decision already made by the Tunisian president. But this decision lacks the tools and the transitional roadmap. The pressure exerted by the country’s leading labour union (UGTT) only compounded Tunisia’s problems and challenges, often bringing no benefit nor helping alleviate the crisis.

The act of partisan political outbidding in parliament turned into union outbidding. Do the unions want to say that it was them who convinced the president that he could not abandon the state’s role in safeguarding social peace by removing subsidies of basic commodities in accordance with the conditions set by the International Monetary Fund for the $1.9 billion loan agreement?

Was there any other concern for Saied beside working to remove the obstacles to democratic transition and leading Tunisia towards the growth it deserves? Wasn’t it that concern which brought him to the presidency?

Was Saied ever part of the Ennahda-led governments that agreed to appease the labour unions with salary increases that ignited inflation, while neglecting all progress in terms of development?

I will be a Tunisian trade unionist for a moment and say that the demands of the UGTT, including its defence of subsidies, are legitimate. But the unions’ demands came without a plan and quite late into the game. President Saied preceded the unions in making such demands in his statements.

Tunisia cannot end subsidies of basic commodities, because that would threaten the state at its core. The impact of such a decision would be much more deleterious than what we see now, as the state keeps redistributing its resources to cover the costs of this commodity or the other: one day, there is a shortage of milk or animal feed, while in other days there are empty shelves of flour or oil. Provide subsidies here and put them off for later in other cases. The withdrawal of subsidies would deprive Tunisians of hope, they all benefit from subsidies.

That being said, I do not endorse unionist demands for higher wages, even when they tell you they have come to an agreement with the government on that. Every month in Tunisia there is something new. New developments make the unions themselves renege on agreements. In light of the general economic situation, Tunisia cannot afford wage increases, especially since these are confined to the public sector. Tunisia needs social and commodity subsidies, not more inflation with salaries that do not even match the workers’ level of productivity.

Tunisia is a difficult country, because it believes in its potential and knows what kind of human resources it has at its disposal. The pre-2011 regimes erred by putting an undue focus on tourism investments. But more importantly, these regimes did not realize where the world was heading after the 2008 global crisis.

Perhaps this is what has prompted President Saied not to prioritise tourism on the list of potential investment targets, had any investment options materialised.

In order to put into perspective the quality of human potential and its value compared to the remunerations they receive, it might suffice to note that the average Tunisian employee earns the equivalent of what an Asian worker earns in the Arab Gulf, although the Tunisian employee lives in his own country where he forms a family and borrows to buy a house and, at times, emigrates to the Gulf and Europe from where he sends remittances.

Tunisia is a country 100 km away from Europe. One day, with adequate investments, Tunisia will be a major business hub on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Things do not need to be rushed, with quick-yield investments that spark inflation and increase salaries. What Tunisia needs, today and now, is an Emirati political decision to provide the type of support that stabilises the country’s economy as soon as possible. Investments will come later.

A leader like Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed is proud of his country’s cultural identity and political status. He is the builder of the UAE’s global stature as a political and strategic “Sparta,” which has stood like a bulwark preventing the collapse of the region in the face of encroaching political Islam and intellectual obscurantism. For a leader like Sheikh Mohammed, Tunisia looks today like a natural ally, deserving a helping hand. Tunisia is a civil “Sparta” that challenged and defeated political Islam and paid the price even before its president decided to remove Ennahda from power.

As a leader who realises the weight of the responsibility that rests on the shoulders of the Tunisian president, who could have easily taken the initiative of appeasing this party or the other, Sheikh Mohammed knows that leaders ensure the glory of their countries through patience, resilience and courageously taking the tough decisions that matter.

Dr Haitham El-Zobaidi is the executive editor of Al Arab Publishing  Group